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Summary findings
In reviewing contracts, establishing price limits, or  degree of market risk a company faces. This has
arbitrating conflicts, regulatory agencies and policy  important implications for regulatory agencies and
advisors face significant information asymmetry in  actions.
determining the appropriate allowed rate of return,  or  When a regulatory agency undertakes a price review,
discount rate. The information  gap is especially  or when issues arise about concession contracts, it is
important in determining the degree of market risk--  important that regulators assess correctly the required
often a critical component  of the cost of capital  rate of return and cost of capital. They must also assess
demanded by operators.  correctly the level of risk, which affects the required  rate
Alexander, Estache, and Oliveri consider various  of return and the cost of capital.
methodological problems in the transport sector in  Most regulators in developing countries have a
establishing the link between regulatory regime and  problem: the regulated companies are unquoted  or
degree of market risk.  undertake  many activities for a range of industries and
The results of quantitative studies confirm that even  even sectors. For them this methodology for measuring
for the transport sector -where  there is intermodal  the cost of capital, calculating the measure of market
competition and where contracts are often shorter and  risk, and estimating the impact of various regulatory
regulatory decisions may be less pressing than for utilities  regimes on market risk may be useful.
- the choice of regulatory regime greatly affects the
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Information on the link between the degree of market risk and the regulatory regime type
is important to regulators of privatized utilities with strong residual monopoly powers. It allows  a
better  understanding  of  what  drives  the  main  concerns  of  the  regulated  companies  and  in
particular it quantifies these concerns. This is important not only for assessing the rate of return
demanded by bidders for projects but to determine the level of profits for a project or company at
the time prices have to be reviewed by the regulators as a part of a normal review or as part of a
conflict resolution process.'  Establishing the right level of forecasted, allowed, profits is difficult
and can easily lead to a situation where either the company:
*  will not want to invest, if too low a level of return has been allowed as a result of a
underestimation of the level of risk; or
*  will either over-invest and/or make abnormal profits if too high a level of return has
been allowed.
This paper considers the issue of market risk and regulatory regimes from the view point of
transport sector regulators.  It builds  on an  initial study undertaken by  Alexander, Mayer  and
Weeds in 1995, which established a methodology for measuring market risk and also considered a
way in which regulatory regimes could be evaluated for utilities.  The methodology followed to
measure risk in the sector is summarized in Section 2.  This  section also considers a  series of
additional issues, some of which arise from the problems raised by the transport sector and others
associated with expanding the analysis applied to  the measure of market  risk.  Section 3.  then
presents the key quantitative results of the paper. Section 4 considers the link between the type of
regulatory regime and the level of market risk while Section 5 concludes.
2.  HOW TO MEASURE RISK?
There are three areas where grasping the methodology and its constraints is important. They are:
*  the measurement of the cost of capital;
*  the calculation of the measure of market risk; and
*  the estimation of the impact of alternative regulatory regimes on the measure of market
risk.
2.1  MEASURING  THE  COST  OF  CAPITAL
Before  nmeasuring risk, the first step  is to agree  on  a benchmark  that  is comparable  across  firms
and across sectors to which these risk measures will apply. The cost of capital is the most common
benchmark used in developed countries by companies and regulators alike. Although the definition
of the cost of capital is itself a challenging task that has generated a lot of literature, the key issue
for many developing countries is to get it done somehow. Indeed, the regulators need to get a good
Although the need for prnce  regulation is less in the transport sector than in other utility and infrastructure sectors, owing to the
potential for the existence of real multi-modal competition, there are still many examples of 'price reviews'  For example,  in some
countries multi-modal competition is not feasible. Hong Kong and Singapore represent such cases when it  comes to passenger
services  from buses and metro services  Equally, the UK has established an industry structure that leads to a need to consider the
access charge for both passenger and freight raii services  to the track infrastructure. Brazil has a system where certain classes of
freight customer may be deemed captive even though the potential for multi-modal competition does exist  So, price reviews and
other forms of behavioral  regulation may be necessary for the transport sector.2
handle on the costs as it drives the most common methodologies used  to assess the market risks as
perceived by operators and investors.
The  standard approach  adopted by  regulatory  agencies  and  governments  is to  use  the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Formally, WACC can be estimated by:
WACC = [(1 - g) x re] + [g x rd]
where:
g  is the level of gearing or  leverage in a company, i.e.  the proportion of debt in the total
capital structure (i.e. debt + equity);2
rd  is the cost of debt finance.  This  is simply measured as risk free rate,  rf,  plus a  debt
premium over this rate,  Pd  . The pre:mium  is either measured directly from the yield of a
company's bond or through comparator information-yields  on new bonds are listed in the
Financial Times at the date of  issuance and are available from  commercial information
sources on a daily basis;and
re  is the cost of equity finance. Its estirnation raises bigger problems, and yet for privatized
infrastructure monopolies, it is quite important since access to debt finance can be quite
restricted for many privatization projects in developing countries.
The most serious challenge at this  stage is to assess the cost of equity.  One of the common
approaches adopted to measuring the cost of equity is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
This estimates the cost of equity as:
re  = rf  +  e (r  - rf)
where:
re  is the cost of equity finance;
rf  is the risk-free return;
A3e  is the equity beta;
rm  is the level of market return; and
r. - rf  is the market risk premium.
Establishing the  values for  each  of these  items is relatively  straight-forward when  developed
capital markets exist and companies are quoted on a stock exchange. Approximations have to be
used in most less-developed countries.
The risk-free rate (rf). The risk-free rate of return is a benchmark figure against which all
investments  in  an  economy  should  be  measured.  Being  risk-free  requires  the  removal,  or
minimization, of repayment risk.  Owing to the ability of a government to raise finance through
taxation,  government bonds are normally taken  as the base  value for  the calculation 3. For  a
regulator in a developing country looking at what its concessionaire may be considering as a risk
free rate, a good proxy may be to  look at  the US or UK interest rate on a Treasury Bond, for
2  Throughout the report gearing will be used to mean either gearing or leverage.
3  A further complication is offered through the existence of inflation risk. A few governments have issued index-linked bonds that
minimise the inflation risk. However,  the vast majority of governments only issue nominal bonds and so inflation risk exists.3
instance, rather than at local rates unless their government's bonds are quoted in US dollars and
the government is widely believed to repay all current and future debts.
The equity risk premium (rm  - rf). The second standard measure in the estimation relates
to the level of additional return that is required to persuade investors to hold equities in preference
to  the  risk  free  instrument.  There  is  much  controversy  surrounding  the  calculation of  this
element-recent  UK  regulatory  experience has focused  on figures  between 4%  and  6%  while
some  parts  of  traditional  finance  theory  suggest  orders  of  magnitude  of,  at  most,  2%.  An
alternative is to measure the historical spread between the yield on a government security and that
of a general market  index. In the US,  this  could be the spread between the yield on a  1 year
Treasury Bill and the returns on the 500 Standard & Poor index.  Evidence has suggested that
figures between 8% and 10% are found when this approach is adopted, both in the US and the
UK. This may reflect a world-wide premium,  to which a country specific premium may have to
be added. However,  determining an exact figure from this premium  is impossible and so range
should be employed. For most countries, using between 5% and 8% should establish a credible
set of boundaries.
The equity beta (fi,). The final, and only company specific, element to be  established is
that of the equity beta. This measures the relative riskiness of the company's equity compared to
the market  as a whole. To  accurately measure the equity beta it is normal to use at least three
years  worth  of  daily  share  price  information  and  preferably  five  years  worth-especially  if
monthly data is used. 4 Since many of the projects that will be considered for privatization in less
developed countries will be provided either by unquoted companies or international firms, it will
not be possible to establish a specific beta value for the project  from the available information.
The  next  section is  concerned  with  estimating  this  value  when  sufficient  information is  not
available.5
2.2 MEASURES OF MARKET RISK
Although  the  CAPM  is  based  around  the  use  of  the  equity beta  as  described  above,  when
determining the appropriate allowed rate of return it is important to start from the basic building
block of an asset beta since this allows:
*  an evaluation of the impact of different gearing levels; and
*  a comparison of underlying risk across companies.
While  the  theory  underlying  beta  calculations  is  now  increasingly  well  understood  among
regulators, the practical needs of the estimation of  a beta value are not yet that well appreciated
among regulatory practitioners. The broad steps are:
1. establish an equity beta value;
2. determine the level of gearing for the company; and
3. establish an asset beta value.
4  There  is a large  academic  literature  on the subject  of how  the beta value  should  be measured.  This is surveyed  in an annex  to
Regulatory  Structure  and Risk and Infrastructure  Firms:  An International  Comparison  by Alexander,  Mayer  and Weeds,  Policy
Research  Working  Paper  1698,1996,  World  Bank.
5  For a more  general  discussion  of the techniques  described  here see  Alexander,  OXERA,  1995  or Industry  Commission  (Australia),
1996.4
It is this third step that regulators should be mnost  interested in since the asset beta captures the
business risks faced by the company that cannot be removed through portfolio diversification by
investors and are not related to the choice of financial structure for the company.  These three
steps are explained in more detail below.
2.2.1  Establishing an equity beta
This involves:
*  collecting daily share price information from the last five years, or if more recently
floated, since the flotation date;
*  collecting values for the appropliate market index for each company
*  estimating the  daily returns  for  the company  and  the index through  the  simple
calculation of the percentage change in share price for each day;
*  removing all non-trading days,  i.e. bank holidays etc. when no trades occur across
the whole market; and
*  regressing  the daily  returns  for the  company against the  daily index returns  to
estimate beta from the following;  equation.
ai  a+  fiRm
where Rt is the return on the company and R,  is the return on the market.
Beta values should be calculated on the basis of:
- a single value over the last five years (or from the day after flotation - so that any
initial underpricing is removed); 6 and
- a value on a year-by-year basis.
In both cases it is important that the standard error of the beta value is also recorded.  In some
cases, multi-utility companies exist.  These raise some issues relating to the estimation of the beta
values that are discussed later.
There are arguments to include dividenid payments in the calculation.  Evidence suggests
that the impact is small and the data requirements are high.  However, it would be useful to check
this when looking at any specific market.  Furiaer,  some background information on the style and
operation of the market should be  included.  For example, does a market maker system exist?
This can have an impact on the certainty with which estimates can be treated.
2.2.2  Calculating gearing(UK)/leveraging(US)
The second step involves calculating the level of net gearing that a company has.  This is a
reflection of the financial structure of the company and, as such, is used to change the equity beta
into an asset beta (discussed below). Net gearing is defined as:
6  If it is possible that  an over-allotment of shares occurred, it is important that the beta value calculation starts once the over-
allotment period is completed. Flotations based on over-allotments have been common in the US for a long time and are starting to
become more common elsewhere.5
Net debt
g  Net debt +  market value of equity
where:
Net debt  =Interest  bearing  debt  -cash  and short  term securities
The  net  debt  figure  should  be  estimated  from  the  book  value  information  from  the
accounts.7 Ideally, the net gearing figure should be calculated for every year that is included in
the equity beta calculation.  This allows both an average over the period and an end point gearing
figure  to  be  used  in  the  calculations  explained below.  This  is  important  if  companies are
undergoing rapid changes in their financial structures, as has been seen in the UK over the last
two years. If possible, it would also be useful to know the national gearing level,  or at least the
average gearing  of all quoted companies, since this may have an impact on changes in relative
financial structure, which is a practical area that has not been explored closely by academia.
2.2.3  Estimating  the asset beta
Once we have the equity beta and the net gearing it is possible to establish an estimate of the asset
beta.  This is done by using the following formula:
13a =  ex  (1-g)
Where fia  is the asset beta and .1e  the equity beta.
So, if the net gearing was 50% and the equity beta was  1, the asset beta would be 0.5.
This is a simplification of the overall relationship. Some doubts have been raised with respect to
the assumption of a zero debt beta and it may be worth investigating the impact of non-zero debt
betas in examples where the companies are highly geared, or the financial markets are likely to
place a high premium on the company owing to the perceived general riskiness of the company.
This could be a very important issue in the less developed countries or where high levels of debt
have been employed in project financing deals.
2.2.4  Does this approach over or underestimate risks?
Recent work has raised some questions relating to  the simplified model adopted in the
majority  of  countries  regarding  the  relationship  between  the  equity  and  asset  betas.
Traditionally, the approach set out earlier in this section is used.  This is based on:
,Ba =:fie  X  (1-g)
The alternative approach can be defined as:
7  A net rather than gross value of gearing is used because a regulator should be interested in the financing of productive assets.  A
company  can easily  change its gross level of gearing  by borrowing  and then investing  the proceeds  in short-term  financial
instruments.  If  a management  chooses  to do this, customers  should  not face  higher  prices  because  of  it.
8  The recent gas arbitration in Victoria provides a good example of the discussions relating to this alternative approach.  See, for
example, The Weighted  Average Cost of Capitalfor the Gas Industry by Professor Kevin Davis, March 1998, available on the Office
of the Regulator General web site.6
+  D/IZ[1-  (1-7  r]
Here,  D/E is an alternative measure of the level of gearing, the standard measure set out
earlier would be D/(D + E).  y is the proportion of shareholders that are eligible for imputation tax
credits and t is the corporate tax rate.9  This approach is based on attributing an impact on the
riskiness of the company both to the financial structure of the company and the way in which it
interacts with the tax system.
9  The difference  between an imputation and classical system of taxation of dividends is linked to the treatment of personal taxes.  A
classical system is based on dividends being paid out of post-tax earnings (i.e. once corporate tax has been paid) and then the
individual being taxed at their marginal personal income tax rate on those dividends. An imputation system is based on some, or all,
the personal income tax payable on the dividends being offset against the corporate tax paid. So, if the imputation tax rate is set at
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Whether this approach is right or wrong is an issue that will not be discussed here.  The
practical implication, however, is to dampen the relationship between the equity and asset betas.
Figure  2-1 illustrates this relationship in the extreme examples of y=1  (the traditional formula
applied in the initial paper and set out earlier in this paper) and y=0 . The estimates of the equity
betas are based on an observed equity beta of 0.9 for 20% gearing  (as defined as D/(D +E)  or
25% as D/E).  A corporate tax rate of 30% has also been assumed. For any level of gearing lower
than that underlying the observed equity beta, the traditional approach underestimates the risks as
the  equity  beta  estimated  that  is  lower  than  that  provided  under  this  alternative  approach.
Similarly, for  any level of gearing that is higher than the observed value, the traditional approach
overestimate the risk i.e.  it will produce an estimate of the equity beta that is higher than this
alternative approach. "
2.3 ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORY  SYSTEMS: CRITERIA  USUALLY  USED
Although the beta estimates are useful by themselves, being able to link the beta values to
a definition of the regulatory regime provides an important tool for policy makers and regulators
throughout the world.  To be  able to  place  the beta values into the  context of the  regulatory
10 From a practical perspective it is not possible to apply the alternative approach to de-gearing an equity beta since the level of
information that  is required is not readily available-in  fact,  establishing the specific characteristics of the shareholders of a
company is extremely  difficult  in most countries. There are also issues as to whether the specific mix of shareholders for a company
should be taken into account by the regulator, or whether an average, or optimum, shareholder mix should be assumed. Since the
applicability  of the alternative approach has not been fully established, this paper will focus on the traditional approach.8
regime it is necessary to establish the structure and detail of the regime. Given the scope of the
sectors and the relative uniformity of regulatory approaches, it is generally possible to establish a
simple classification process.  Three categories of regulatory regime are generally identified:
*  high-powered regimes-these  are regimes where significant incentives for companies to
reduce  costs are established thrcough  CPI  - X type, regimes  (price-caps,  revenue-caps
etc.);
*  medium-powered regimes-these  regimes involve some incentivisation of companies, but
normally through hybrid schemes and less explicit regulatory regimes; and
*  low-powered regimes-these  are basically the standard rate-of-return type approaches to
regulation.
When determining the type of regulatory regime that is in place there are a range of areas to
consider.  These areas include both institutional and economic aspects.  Key elements to include
are:
*  If an incentive based regime, how long is the period between the price reviews?
*  How is investment treated?
*  How much discretion is the regulator allowed at each review? And
*  What are the characteristics of the regulatory office?
2.4 ADDITIONAL  DETAILS  TO BE ADDRESSED
As  has been  noted  earlier,  transport  raises  a  series  of  additional  issues that  require  further
analysis.  These include the problems associated with the multiple country and sector operations
of some companies, and the desire to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of the
regime and the industry structure with the beta value.  This paper focuses on the former issue
since it is of  great significance to many regulators,  while the latter issue will be  the focus of
future research.
2.4.1  Disaggregation of beta values
Many of the companies considered in the paper have either multiple operations (for example,
bus franchises in many areas and/or countries).  Further,  many of the services provided by the
companies in the transport sector, especially in relation to road based transport, are municipal in
nature owing to the lack of significant infrastructure.  This means that contracts often lead to the
provision of services by either:
*  small, local companies that are not quoted on a stock market; or
*  large, national and international quoted companies that hold several contracts.
The diversity of players explains why contract types differ a lot. This  creates a problem as
differences between contracts can lead to  an  averaging effect  since the  observable measure  of
market risk is an average of the market risk inherent in each of the contracts. Also, many of the
contracts are short-term, generally between three and five-years."  Since the standard approach to
An example is the way in which the UK unbundled its rail industry.  The vast majority of rolling stock was passed to three leasing
companies that then  had contracts with the 26 train  operating companies.  These train  operating companies have started to
purchase rolling stock but are essentially management companies handling a series of contracts with the infrastructure providers9
estimating the measure of market risk requires five years worth of information, this may mean
that the contract is held for only part of the estimation period.  Consequently, greater emphasis
may have to be placed on shorter time periods,  although that raises a concern about the stability
of the estimates:
*  business  activities  are  quite  heterogeneous:  for  example,  common  groupings  include
mining and rail interests or bus services and property. The diversity of transport company
types is also an issue.  There is a mixture of companies that focus on specific industries
while others have a much broader nature.  Infratil  in Australia covers both energy and
airports,  Stagecoach in  the UK  does  bus  and  all  rail.  This  often leads,  to  having to
establish additional categories, such as integrated transport. The main issue here is that
the sector specific risk is hard to assess. On the other hand,  it recognizes that the market
and the operators are finding ways to pool business to reduce the average risk level; and
*  the geographic coverage of the companies also matter.  While not as open as some utility
industries, there is a tendency for transport companies to have an international exposure.
If there are differences in the regulatory regimes across countries, then the estimate of the
measure of market risk is an average of the exposures in each of the countries.  For some
countries  it  is  not  even  possible  to  establish precise  measures  of  risk  since  all  the
companies operating in a particular  industry in that country are either unquoted or  are
foreign subsidiaries.  Examples of this problem can be seen in Latin and Central America.
Kansas City Southern Industries, an American company, is responsible for rail operations
both in America and in Mexico.  Further,  none of the Mexican rail companies are directly
quoted on a stock market.  Burlington Northern,  another US rail company, was a part of
the consortium that was involved in the privatization of New Zealand's  rail industry and
has been active elsewhere in the world,  including Argentina.  Finally, Brazil established
seven rail concessions with a requirement for six of them to be floated on the local stock
markets, but so far only two have done so and both are unavailable for use in a project
like this owing to the fact that one of them is listed on a small private closed exchange
and the other has been floated for much less than the five years  necessary to establish a
reliable estimate of market risk.
Because of this,  the equity and asset betas found for the quoted companies should be treated as
average betas reflecting the mixture  of individual business betas,  where  a  business is  either a
distinct activity or a separate geographic area.  While the majority of the analysis undertaken in
this paper is concerned with the company beta,  since it is the observable element, there is also a
desire to establish specific business and geographic betas.  This is because much of the analysis
on performance for a regulatory regime requires a benchmark of a business specific beta value.
Further,  much of the regulatory process for establishing a price control requires an analysis of the
market's perception of the risk associated with that activity.
In that context, two key issues have to be considered:
*  How should a beta value be disaggregated? And
*  Which value of gearing to employ?
and running the actual train services.10
How to Disaggregate?.  As mentioned above, the group beta value can be considered as a
weighted average of the individual company beta values.  This can be defined as:
n
,#G  afll
fi  =  E aiA
i  l
This is where: Ide  is the equity beta (it could be replaced by  Ba' the asset beta) in the formula;
G relates to the group beta;
i is the individual business or geographic unit where there are n such units; and
a' is the weight associated with each such business unit.
The weights are based on the net assets employed in each business, as a proportion of the total net
assets of the group.  So:
Ce  - Ai
NA,
i=l
When actually calculating the proportions,  it is normal to  ensure that the net assets for  all the
businesses add up to 1.  If the group net assets, rather than the sum of the business unit net assets,
is used there is a high probability that the sum of weights will be less than 1, owing to the impact
of unassigned assets, head-quarters assets etc.  To remove this problem, it is simplest to assume
that the sum of the individual business units is the group net asset value.
Which leverage  to use? A further issue that must be investigated is whether this approach
should be adopted using the company's average gearing ratio for each of the business units,  or the
business units'  industry average level of gearing.  By assuming that all business activities have the
same gearing ratio as the company average is a strong assumption to impose on the business unit.
For example, if a company is composed of two business units operating in diverse activities, such
as financial services and rail operations, it is an extremely strong assumption to make that each of
the business units has the same gearing as the company average.  If all other companies in that
business activity have a  very  different level  of  gearing  to  the  average  for  the  multi-business
company, then the values established for the individual beta values are likely to be  out-of-line
with  investor perceptions  of  risk.  Consequently,  when  disaggregating  a  company  beta  it  is
preferable to rely on the gearing ratios specilFic  to those  individual business activities.  This  is
most easily achieved by using the equity betas for the comparator business activities since they
embody the industry average gearing-.' 2
There may be one case where the assumption of the business unit having the same gearing as
the average  for that industry  could be  called into doubt.  This relates  to the situation when a
business is  operating in  a  separate  geographic  area.  If  foreign owned  companies are  treated
differently than domestic companies with respect to taxation, especially for repatriation of profits
in the form of dividends, then the capital structures of domestically and foreign owned companies
are likely to differ.  However, there are three reasons why this should be noted but not acted on.
They are:
12  When using comparators to disaggregate the beta value the simplest approach is to chose the appropriate market index for each of
the business activities and to establish an equity beta for that market index. So for financial activities,  a market index of banking and
financial companies would provide the best comparator.*  regulation is interested in the issue of a stand-alone business - if ownership is taken into
account then, as  exchange rates,  interest rates and  tax regimes  change,  the regulatory
body will be effectively promoting changes in ownership to  achieve the lowest cost of
capital.  This is an issue best left to the management of the companies;
*  most  regulatory systems make a  range of  simnplifying  assumptions,  especially regarding
tax, which mean that this level of sophistication is never reached; and
*  it is difficult to establish the tax positions of all the countries involved in the study and, as
such, it is better to leave them on a consistent but uncorrected basis.
This  approach  does  not,  however,  completely  remove  the  need  for  trying  to  establish  the
company's  gearing ratio in each business, since it would be preferable to establish an asset beta
for  the  foreign assets  of  companies involved  in  the  study.  Provided  that  there  is  only  one
'unknown'  it should be possible, through the use of comparator gearing levels, to  determine an
estimate of the asset beta for the unknown business.
To illustrate the approach suggested, consider the case of Kansas City Southern Industries
(KCSI), a rail business in the US.  This company undertakes two main activities, rail services and
financial  services, with the  former undertaken  in the US  and  Mexico while the latter  is only
undertaken in the US.  This section illustrates how an estimnate  of the asset beta for the Mexican
rail business could be derived. The numbers used here are illustrative.  Table 2-1 sets out the data
used in this example.
Business  % of net  Comparator  Comparator or actual,/37  Gearing (%l)
assets
Group  1000.90  50.0
Faclials  2  S&Fiancials  1.10  30.0
R  ail  .... 800  ...............
US  Rail  600  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~S&P  Transport  0.95  70.0
Mexican  R  ..  20...  ......  ...  0  ____________________________
From the information above, it is possible to establish values fo  r the rail and Mexican rail
businesses.  For example, the combined rail business will have an equity beta value determined
by:
0.83R  =I38G  - 0.  2/[F
R=  0.68
0.60. 8= 0.85
Similarly, with a proxy for the US Rail equity beta, it is then possible to determine the
estimate of  the Mexican Rail  equity beta.  Further,  given the  information on KCSI's  capital
structure and the proxy values for gearing for financial services and US rail,  an asset beta can be
estimated for the Mexican rail business.  These results are set out in Table 2-2.
Business  %o  of net  Comparator  Comparator  or  Gaig(/lo)fi
assets  actual 
13e12
...  ........  ...  ...  . . .........  ............  .... .... ........  ... .........  .... ..........  .......  ....... ........  .. ......  ...... ... ..... .....  ......  ............ .................  ....  ......  .......  .. ....  ......  ....  ..  . ...... .... . ........................  ..  .............  ..........  ...-...  .......  ....
Group  100  0.90  50.0  0.45
Financials  20.0  S&PFinancials  1.10  30.0  0.77
--.-- _  --------  ..............................................  ... .......................... .........  ........ .......-.............. .........  ... .....  ..... 
Rail.  80.0  . 0.85  55.0  0.38
US Rail  60  S&T  srt  05  70°0  0°28
Mexican  20.0  0.55  100  0.49
Rail
From this example it is possible to estimate an asset beta for the Mexican rail system.  The fact
that it is higher than the US rail asset beta could be due to:
*  Mexico  having  a  regulatory  system  that: places  greater  risk  on  the  operating  companies
through the establishment of greater incentives; or
*  a difference in the exposure to market rislk owing to greater risk in the industries that use the
rail system to transport freight in Mexico c:ompared  to the US.
3.  ESTIMATES  OF  SECTOR  SPECIFIC  RISKS  ACROSS  REGIONS
The transport sector covers a wide range of industries. Table 3-1 provides a sunmary  of the
industries and industry segments covered by  the paper.'3 In total,  15 countries were included in
the  study, including 71 companies." 4 The average  number of companies per  country is 4.25,
although there is one extreme example of a  country with 21 companies and  six cases where a
country has only one company in the sample.  The country with 21 companies is Japan, which has
21 private rail companies.  A complete list of the companies involved in the study is provided in
Annex 1. In some cases, there are companies that could not be included in the study owing to a
lack of information.  For exarnple, Auckland International Airport has been privatized and floated
on  the  New  Zealand Stock  Market,  but  this  took  place  in  1998  and  so  only  very  limited
information is  available.  Hence it has  not been  included in  the study,  although it  should be
considered in any future update of this project.
With this data base, the paper adopts:
*  beta values based on data covering at least one year, and where possible, five years worth of
data to September 1998;
*  a gearing value based on the market value cf equity and the book value of net debt;
*  the latest year-end gearing value; and
*  the traditional approach to de-gearing equity beta values to establish the asset betas.
Industry  Sub-industries  NIVumber  of countries  Number of companies ~~  _  _  ..,  ..  - _  ....  ............  ... .... .................  .. ... ... ... ..  . . ...............  . ...... .... ..........  .....  .... ... ........................................  ..........  ...
Rail  Rail  infrastructure  1  . .-~--  ~  ...  ......  .......  .-- ...  .--.-......  ..................-..  _  ............  . .....  ..  .......  --  --  -----  ---  ----  -----  ............  .................
Rail services  6  34
Road  _  Toll roads  6  11
13  As with all regulated industries, Government has an option of establishing an industry structure that limits the need for conduct or
behavioural regulation. Transport, owing  to the multi-modal issues raised,  may be a sector where it is easier to establish a structure
that needs only limited conduct regulation.
14  The actual coverage of countries is, however,  much higher. For example, a company like Antofagasta Holdings has been considered
as a British company even though it provides rail services  in (hile.  Further, many of the large American and European companies
have operations in a significant  number of countries.13
Bus services  2  4
Integrated  Road,  rail and air  I  4
Air  Airport  infrastructure  5  5
Ports  Port infrastructure  2  6
Other infrastructure  Tunnels  and bridges  4  6
Tables  3.2  and  3.3  present  the  average  beta,  equity  and  asset  respectively,  for  each
industry within each continent.  It also provides an indication of the number of companies over
which the beta value has been averaged.  The beta values were calculated over a five year period
to September 1998.  15 As seen from annex 1, there were 71 companies involved in the calculation
of equity betas and 64 for asset betas.  This difference arises because of the lack of accounting
data for some companies.
egion  XAirports  . Roads  Rall  . Ports  Buses  . Other  All
Europe  0.7450  05826  0;43180.3851  0.5824
4  7  4  6  21
----- ~~~~~~~~..  --  ..........  ......  . ..  ....  --- i.  -..-  ..........  ....  --  ....  _  ._.  ._....a__._.__  ...........  ........ ... .....  ..  ...  ... ___..  ....  ...... ..... ...  ... Asia  0.9089  0.4801  0.8278  0.6664  0.6964 '  0.5640
2  21  1  4  3  31
Oceania  07668  05157  0.5795  0.4944  0.7118  i  0.5562
l  2  1  1.  5  I  10 ....  ..........  ........  ...... . ....  ..  .. ....................................  ......  ...............  ................  ....... America  21  9470  04
* Others is Integrated transport mostly
Table 3.2 suggests that looking at the risk levels for equity investors, this is on average not
a very risky sector. There is of course a selection bias since the companies picked up by our data
base are companies already in the stock markets and since the deals covered actually took place
they were by definition less risky than many of those than have not yet taken place-and  there are
many of those since commitments are significantly larger than disbursements in the sector. Across
regions,  Oceania appears  to  be  the  least risky  region  (essentially Australia).  America  is  the
riskiest region to a large extent because the sample covers many of the Latin American railways
deals which  have  subject to  many  shocks over  the  last three  to  four  years  and  the  US  and
Canadian  deals are  not  "unrisky"  enough to  offset the high  risk  in  Latin  American projects
Across sectors, airport is the riskiest sector, while ports is the least risky pure sector.
~~rope  0.5877  ~~~~  0.4439  0.523  0.40467
__4  S  2  sl  16 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  _........  .. ..  ...  ............  .......  .........  .....  ..  .....  ........  ....  ......  .i......  ............  ....... I  . .. . ..... .......... ....
AsIa  0~~~~~  ~  ~~.4770  0.2480  0.3959  0.7769  0.7988 I  0.3938-
2.  20  .. 1  4  31  30
?  0.7086  . 0.3073  0.4363  0.4232  - . ..  0.4306
1  2  1  S  9
a~~~~~~~~~~...........  .I......  . ...  .. ..  . .....  ..  ..  ........  ..  ......  -_ _._  .... - _  ._  ..  ...  ...........  ...................  ..  ....  . . . .
15  For some companies a shorter period had to be utilised since they have not been listed for five years.  In those cases, a minimum
requirement was to have one years worth of daily data.14
Airports  Road  I  'Rail  Ports  Busas  Other  All
America0.73063
9  ~~~~~~~~~~~9
All  0.6118  ~~0.4209  i  0-3918  0.4186  0.7769  0.4508  0.4471
S  ~~~~~~32  6  4  864
Once the gearing  is taken  into accounit,  the average  risk  level  of the  sector decreases
further and quite significantly for most sectors.  In  fact, it decreases for  all sectors,  except for
buses as a result of various aspects of the comnpanies  covered by the Asia sample,  for example
significant net cash balances and regulatory regimes that discouraged borrowing.  The interesting
change in comparison to the pure equity risk is that once the possibility of debt financing is taken
into account, rail becomes the least risky sector.
The average figures summnarized  here hide some issues identified during the calculation that
required further study.  They include:
*  the impact of significant net cash balances jor some companies.  Clear examples of companies
that have a positive net cash balance, and so an asset beta that is greater than the equity beta,
include Vienna Airport and some companies operating in Hong Kong (including buses); and
*  the impact of market structure and inter-modal competition.  For example, although US rail
regulation has traditionally focused on a rate of return approach, the market structure is such
that the exposure  to inter-modal competition for freight traffic  (passengers are handled by a
separate company) leads to a beta value closer to 1 than would have been expected.
Further,  in estimating the betas an issue that had to be  addressed was the existence of negative
equity betas for  some bus companies in the  UK.  While a  negative equity beta is  in principle
possible,  it is important to ensure that this is a fair measure of the underlying business risk and
not a product of infrequent trading or one of a hiost of other possible measurement problems. The
solution has been to test the robusteness of the-  estimates by redoing for various  time intervals
(daily, monthly and quarterly) and focus on the: more consistent estimates.  In the case where a
negative value persisted after the investigation explained above, the company was excluded from
the sample.
4.  IMPACT OF REGULATORY REGIME ON TIHE  SECTOR SPECIFIC RISK
This section links the assessment of the characteristics of the regulatory regimes to the asset beta
values.  Table  4.1  provides  a  summary of the  assessment  of regulatory  regimnes  and  industry
structure for those countries and sectors where suifficient  information wasavibl.6
.a..  4.  Suar....ultryrgie
16  In a desire to ensure that as many companies as possible are inicluded in the analysis some subjective decisions have been taken.
The raw data is provided in the annexes to the full paper and so re-estimation based on alternative interpretations of the subjective
information is possible.15
. . . . . . . . . .. m  e  .................
High-powered  Airports  (UK,  Australia),  Buses  (Singapore),,  Railways  (UK),  Roads  (Australia),  and
Others (UK).
Medium-powered  Airports (Italy,  Denmark,  Austria), Buses (UK - London, Australia - Sydney), Railways
(Australia) and Roads (Italy).
Low-powered  Buses (Hong Kong), Railways (Argentina, USA, Japan), and Tunnels (Hong Kong).
Taking this allocation into account, it is possible to establish the relationship between the
degree of incentives contained within the regulatory regime and the measure of market risk for
that  industry.  Overall,  it has been possible  to place  48  of  the 64 observations within a  clear
regulatory regime although, there had to be some subjective decisions. This table shows that, in
general,  the  relationship  established  in  the  original  paper  also  holds  true  for  the  transport
industries.  However, as mentioned earlier, for some of the industries the exposure to inter-modal
competition or other factors leads to a breakdown in the relationship.  Rail is a good example of
this where the regulation and market risk relationship holds for the UK and Japan, but does not
hold for the US companies, although the averaging presented  in the summary table masks this
result to a certain extent.
T*tai  0.61 ~~~~~~~~1046  0.36  0.25  0.245  0.42
(2)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (5)  (12)
i  ~~~~0.56  0.15  0.46
. (3)  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(1)  (4)
0.52  0.35  _0.80  0.40
.i,;  0  0  ~~~(2)  (00027)  =  X(32  (32) 
0.61  0.69  0.36  0.25  0.45  0.42
- E  ~~~~~~~(5)  (3)  (29)  (3)  (8)  (48)
Further,  there is a much wider dispersion between industries within the transport sector than
what may have been expected.  Possible explanations for this include:
*  the impact of inter-modal competition.  For some industries, such as the bus or freight-
rail industries, there are clear and credible alternatives which may have low or negligible
switching costs associated with them;
*  the heightened exposure of some industries to market  risk owing to the importance of
general macroeconomic conditions to the demand for services such as freight or business
travel; and
*  the impact of the choice of short-term contract based regulatory systems.
The overall  finding that medium-powered regimes  have a  higher asset beta than high-powered
regimes  should be treated very  carefully.  First,  the number of  companies in  either  sample is
small,  and second,  the mix of industries is very different.  In the two industries where a direct
comparison can be made, as expected, the high-powered regime has a higher average asset beta
value than the medium-powered regime.
So, when making comparisons it is advisable to use both the industry specific information and
the totals:16
*  the industry specific figures allow for the capture of the specific business risks but suffers
from the problem that the sample is often small and frequently only  covers two of the
three regulatory regimes; and
*  the total figures are based on a wider  sample of companies and includes examples of all
forms  of regulatory  regime.  However,  it also  represents an  averaging of the specific
business risks that appear to differ significantly between industries.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Regulatory  agencies  and  policy  advisers  face  significant  information asymmetry  when
determining what  the  appropriate  allowed  rate  of  return,  or  discount  rate,  should be  when
reviewing contracts, establishing price limits atl  a price review or arbitrating conflicts.  This issue
is especially important when determining the degree of market risk often a critical component in
influencing the cost of capital demanded by operators.
This paper  has considered the  various methodological questions  raised in  the transport
sector when establishing this link between the degree of market risk and regulatory regime. The
quantitative results  confirm that  even  for the  transport  sector,  where  inter-modal competition
exists, contracts are often shorter than for utilities and regulatory decisions may be less pressing
than for utilities, the choice of regulatory regimne  still has a significant impact on the degree of
market risk  faced by a company.  This has imaportant  implications for regulatory  agencies and
their actions.
Most specifically, when a price review is undertaken or when issues arise in the context of
a concession contract, it is important that the right level of required rate of returnlcost of capital
be assessed by the regulators. This required rate of return/cost of capital level will be influenced
by the risk level which must also be assessed by the regulators.  Most regulators in developing
countries face a scenario where the regulated companies are unquoted or undertake a wide range
of activities across a range of industries and even sectors.  In such situations, the results of this
study provide a useful starting point for the necessary analysis. In addition, this study also sets out
a methodology that could be used to expand the study or focus it on a set of comparators with the
greatest relevance to an ongoing review.Country  Industry  I  !nr  Euiybeta  Asset beta
Australi  Arports  Isifratil  Asrla-  {/4
___________  Roadg  Hills Motorway  (b  __________ {Roads  Tasra  ___  ___  _____  __  ____  __  ,  __
Austtia  AiJrports7  '  Vienna Airport  4'V
Canada  Rail  Canadian National  1-  _
......... _..._  .....  ..  ....  . ......  . . .........  ...... _........_.....  ... _  .....  ..  ......  .......  . .....
_______  Rail  Canadian Pacific  I'
Denmark  Airports  Copenhagen  Airport4''
Hong Kong  Buses  Citybus  14
1Buses jKowloon  Motorbus  1  4V
RodsRakn
_______  Other  ~~Crossharbour  Tunnel  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
.1 Other  iNew  World Infrastructure  . '4
Italy  AiUrports  Rome Airport____4  _  '
. Ro5ads  1Autostrada Torino-Milan  I 
.IRoads  Autostrada PV.-
Japan  RalEast  Japan Railway  4  __4
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____  Rail  T~  Centra  Japan Railway4  '/
_____  TRail  TFukulyama  Transport4''
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___________  Rail  OdlakyuElectne R/way  /4
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- ~~~~RailTku-j 
New Zealand  TRail  TranzR.ail  Hot  'ngs  4  _  _4
____________  Ports  Lyttelion Port Co.4  4
________________  Ports  Northland Port Corp.  4'4
_______________  Ports  Ports of Auckland  V  '4
Port  Port of Tauranga  4''
___ ___  ___  ___  __  Other  Infratil International4'_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Philippines  j  otVnentoa  otie  emnl4  - 4
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Integrated  .. GoAhed.Goup.............  ___  __  4
___________________  Integrated  First  Group  ____4
___________  Other  Furotunnel  Group4''
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Rail  casasiySuhrx'4
____________  __  afl  Wisconsin Central Transport4''
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